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  This paper reviews the evidence on the relationship between openness 
and inflation. There is a robust negative relationship across countries, first 
documented by Romer (1993), between a country’s openness to trade and 
its long-run inflation rate. However, a key part of the standard explana-
tion for this relationship—that central banks have a smaller incentive to 
engineer surprise inflations in more-open economies because the Phillips 
curve is steeper—seems at odds with the facts. While the United States is 
still not a very open economy by conventional measures, there are chan-
nels through which global developments may influence the nation’s infla-
tion. We document evidence that global resource utilization may play a 
role in U.S. inflation and suggest avenues for future research.
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ne of the most striking events of the past two decades has been the 
remarkable decline in inflation around the world. Figure 1 presents 
the basic facts. The median global inflation rate was 10 to 15 percent for 
most of the 1970s, 5 to 10 percent in the 1980s, and since then has been 
around 5 percent or less.1 During the 1980s, the average annual inflation 
rate for developing countries was 36.7 percent and for industrial countries, 
6.2 percent.2 In the 1990s, the numbers were 36 and 2.8 percent, respec-
tively. Since 2000, inflation has averaged just 5.8 percent in developing 
countries and 2 percent in industrial countries.3
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  U.S. inflation has also dropped dramatically since the 1970s. After 
peaking at 11.5 percent in March 1980, inflation as measured by the Per-
sonal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator fell to an average of 4 to 
5 percent by the latter half of the 1980s, then to 2 percent or less by the 
turn of the century. The low inflation the United States experienced in 
the late 1990s was unexpected. For most of the decade, inflation and un-
employment declined together, contrary to what might be expected based 
on traditional Phillips curves, which posit a negative relationship between 
the two. This caused traditional models to systematically overestimate 
inflation, which gave rise to “missing inflation.”
  Figure  2  shows  the  discrepancy  between  the  actual  inflation  rate 
and a forecast series based on a traditional backward-looking Phillips 
curve model that includes lagged inflation, the U.S. unemployment rate, 
1 We plot the median rather than the average inflation rate because of the existence of 
some extreme outliers. 
2 We use the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook classification of 
countries as developing and industrialized. 
3 The volatility and persistence of inflation also seem to have declined in recent years. 














































and measures to control for aggregate shocks.4 A simple backward-look-
ing Phillips curve estimated on data through fourth quarter 1990 does a 
reasonable job of forecasting inflation for the first couple of years of the 
decade but after 1995 or so, fails disastrously. 
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  Many factors are believed to have contributed to the drop in inflation 
worldwide and in the U.S.: globalization, better monetary policy, luck, 
the emergence of the New Economy and the attendant acceleration of 
productivity, among them. All these factors likely played a role, and disen-
tangling the relative importance of each remains an important challenge.5 
However, not only did inflation fall, there were also significant changes in 
the relationship between inflation and measures that have traditionally 
helped forecast inflation, as well as in inflation dynamics. It is now well es-
tablished that U.S. inflation is less responsive to measures of the domestic 
output gap than in the past. Roberts (2006) is representative of the papers 
that have documented this.
  Figure 3 shows recursive estimates of the coefficient on the unemploy-
ment rate in the simple backward-looking Phillips curve model we use to 
generate the forecasts in Figure 2. The coefficient goes from being nega-
tive and statistically significant for most of the 1970s and ’80s, to being 
marginally significant in the early 1990s, to having the wrong sign from   
4 Specifically, inflation as measured by the annualized quarter-to-quarter change in the 
deflator for Personal Consumption Expenditures excluding food and energy is modeled as a 
linear function of four lags of itself (with the coefficients constrained to sum to 1), the lagged 
unemployment rate, and one lag of the quarter-to-quarter change in the price of oil imports 
relative to the GDP deflator.
5 For example, Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) look at the reasons for the markedly 
lower volatility in U.S. GDP growth and inflation since 1984 relative to the previous twenty-
five years. They find that good luck (favorable exogenous circumstances independent of 
policy) is primarily responsible for the reduction in output volatility, while inflation has 














































Figure 3: Recursive Estimates of the Coefficient on the Unemployment 
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the mid-1990s on. This particular pattern is, of course, specific to this 
model, but it is qualitatively similar to that found in other models.6 
  This paper looks at the role globalization may have had in lowering 
inflation and making it less responsive to measures of domestic resource 
utilization, such as the unemployment rate. We survey the literature on 
openness and inflation and illuminate the channels whereby openness may 
lead to lower inflation.7 We first look at different approaches to measuring 
the openness of economies along various dimensions. Then we describe the 
channels through which globalization may lower inflation. We examine 
the evidence on the importance of the various channels and evaluate the 
robustness of the findings in the empirical literature. 
1. QUANTITATIVE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION
  We begin by presenting data that illustrate how integrated the world 
has become in recent years. Perhaps the best approach to measuring an 
economy’s openness—the extent of its integration with the rest of the 
world—is to look for deviations between the prices of goods and services 
within the economy from those prevailing on world markets. This approach 
is rarely adopted because of data limitations. As Knetter and Slaughter 
(1999) note, it is very difficult to obtain comprehensive international data 
on local prices of products with identical characteristics. The limited data 
that are available do not point to strong conclusions about the evolu-
tion of market integration in recent years. In the price data they look at, 
Knetter and Slaughter find evidence of greater integration between the 
countries of Europe—little surprise, given the European Union’s major ef-
forts in recent years to foster a single market. The evidence for developing 
countries is more mixed, with some seeming to converge in relative prices,   
6 See, for example, Roberts (2006) or even earlier, Tootell (1998).














































while others do not. The quantity data Knetter and Slaughter examine 
show stronger evidence of product market integration since 1970. 
  The most commonly used measure of openness is the sum of imports 
and exports divided by gross domestic product. Figure 4 shows the devel-
opment of worldwide and U.S. openness over the past forty years. Imports 
and exports as a share of world GDP rose from 20 percent in 1965 to more 
than 50 percent in 2003. Over the same period, the importance of trade in 
goods and services to the U.S. economy rose from less than 10 percent to 
about a quarter of GDP. 
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  What has driven this increase in trade? Technological advances in 
transportation (most notably, the containerization revolution and devel-
opment of larger ships and aircraft) and communication, as well as policy 
changes in the form of reduced tariff and nontariff barriers, have been key. 
Figure 5 presents some measures of average tariff rates for a variety of 
countries. There is a clear trend toward lower formal barriers to trade over 
the past four decades. Much of this has been driven by successive rounds 
of trade liberalization under the auspices of the World Trade Organiza-
tion and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Of 
course, these data do not take account of the greater use of nontariff trade 
barriers in recent years.
  Summarizing obstacles to free trade in a single measure is difficult, 
although Anderson and Neary (2005) have developed a framework that 
makes such calculations easier. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) assess the 
relative importance of income growth and changes in trade policy and 
transportation costs in the growth of trade between the countries in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. They find that 
about two-thirds of the increase can be explained by income growth, with 
tariff rate reductions accounting for about a quarter and lower transporta-
tion costs explaining just under 10 percent.
  While these measures focus on trade in goods and services, an equally 




































































NOTE: U.S. tariff calculated using federal government customs duty accruals divided by general imports of goods 
  on a customs value basis.
SOURCE: World Bank.
Percent Percent
most of the postwar period, international capital flows were limited be-
cause of widespread controls designed to facilitate the management of 
exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system. With Bretton Woods’ 
collapse in the early 1970s, capital accounts were gradually liberalized, 
and over time investors have become more willing to invest abroad. The 
International Monetary Fund (2006) reports that in the 1970s, more than 
three-quarters of industrial countries had restrictions of some sort on in-
ternational financial transactions. By the 2000s, none did. Likewise, the 
percentage of emerging-market economies with restrictions on internation-
al financial transactions fell from 78.7 percent in the 1970s to 58 percent 
in the 2000s. As a result of these liberalizations, international capital flows 
have increased dramatically.
  Figure 6 uses data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) to give some 
sense of these capital flows’ importance. The figure shows the value of 
international (cross-border) assets plus liabilities held worldwide and by 
the United States as a percentage of GDP. This measure includes portfolio 
equity assets, foreign direct investment, and debt assets. International as-
sets and liabilities as a share of global GDP rose from less than 5 percent 
in 1970 to more than 120 percent in 2004. For the U.S., foreign assets and 
liabilities amounted to just under 17 percent of GDP in 1970 but had risen 
to 84 percent by 2004.
  While not as significant (quantitatively) as capital flows, flows of work-
ers across national borders are also an important dimension of globaliza-
tion. We are accustomed to thinking of the United States as a nation of 
immigrants. As of 2005, immigrants accounted for 12.9 percent of the U.S. 
population (Figure 7). The U.S. also hosted 20 percent of all international 
migrants, by far the largest share of any country. Yet immigrants are also 
an important presence in other countries. They make up 12.3 percent of 
Germany’s population, 10.7 percent of France’s, 14 percent of Ireland’s, 
20.3 percent of Australia’s, 62.1 percent of Kuwait’s, and 78.3 percent of 
Qatar’s. (In some cases, the large percentage of foreigners simply reflects 



























































SOURCE: Web appendix to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip.
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SOURCE: United Nations, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision.
  At the global level, international migrants constitute only 2.9 percent 
of the world’s population, up from 2.1 percent in 1975. Much of the increase 
is the result of previously internal migrants being reclassified as interna-
tional migrants after the Soviet Union’s disintegration in 1991. However, 
there have been dramatic changes in the international mobility of workers 
in the European Union, where formal barriers have been effectively elimi-
nated. Countries like Ireland, the U.K., and Sweden—which immediately 
opened their doors to workers from the ten nations that joined the EU in 
2004—have clearly benefited in recent years from increased immigration. 
  It is not just legal migration that matters for inflation. Passell (2006) 
estimates that about 7 million illegal immigrants work in the United States, 
accounting for just under 5 percent of the labor force. This is a nontrivial 














































sectors in which these immigrants work. Most are employed in sectors that 
produce services not traded internationally, such as construction, food 
service, and home maintenance. Assuming many of the immigrants in the 
United States illegally are low skilled, Cortes’ (2006) estimates suggest 
they may significantly affect the price of the average nontraded good.
  Looking at the numbers, capital and goods are clearly more interna-
tionally mobile than workers.8 Indeed, the presence of significant barriers 
to immigration is one of the key differences between the current era of 
globalization and the one that preceded World War I. 
2. THEORY
  Most traditional models have surprisingly little to say about globaliza-
tion’s effect on price levels, as manifested in increased trade or factor flows. 
Rather, the emphasis has traditionally been on how economic integration 
(trade and factor mobility) affects relative prices and real factor returns. 
But we can obtain some insight into globalization’s potential effect on U.S. 
inflation by identifying some obvious channels. The direct and indirect 
price effects of cheaper imports of finished goods and intermediate inputs 
may net out to a decline in the overall price level. Additionally, opening 
an economy to the world may alter the incentives to which its central bank 
responds in determining the country’s long-run inflation rate. 
  For starters, there is a direct effect. Greater availability of cheaper 
goods from abroad will lower the domestic price level, since the consump-
tion bundle used to compute broad inflation measures includes imported 
goods. The magnitude of this effect depends on the share of imports in the 
consumption bundle of the representative household. As countries become 
more open, the share of imports generally rises. But even in the most 
open economies, the consumption bundle includes a significant amount 
of nontraded goods and services. Perhaps the best example is the service 
flow from owner-occupied housing, which currently accounts for about 
a quarter of the U.S. Consumer Price Index. Furthermore, many goods 
traded internationally typically have to be combined with a large amount 
of nontraded domestic marketing and distribution services before they 
reach the final consumer.9 
  Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that import prices may directly 
affect domestic price developments, and this has led to the inclusion of 
import prices in recent specifications of empirical Phillips curves. Inclusion 
of a measure of import prices (usually the prices of so-called core imports, 
which in the U.S. means imports excluding energy, computers, and semi-
conductors) may also capture some of globalization’s indirect effects on 
the price level. For example, domestic producers are forced to lower their 
prices in response to foreign competition, and cheaper inputs from foreign 
8 See Freeman (2006) for evidence; he notes a lot more variation in wages for similar 
occupations around the world than in prices of similar goods or in the cost of capital.














































sources will lead to lower costs. The size of these effects will be governed 
by the ease with which foreign imports of intermediate and final goods can 
be substituted for domestically produced versions of the same goods. Yet 
another channel through which globalization may lower domestic prices is 
through lower nominal wage demands resulting from lower prices for im-
ported final-consumption goods. Again, the size of this effect will depend 
on the importance of imports to the average worker. 
  Globalization could also lower inflation indirectly, with the increased 
competition fostering faster domestic productivity growth. Because trade 
enables countries to specialize in the activities in which they enjoy a com-
parative advantage, sectors in which countries are relatively inefficient 
shrink, while sectors in which they have a comparative advantage expand. 
Faster productivity growth allows firms to pay higher wages without pass-
ing these costs on in the form of higher prices.
  Grossman and Helpman (1991) identify four possible channels through 
which increased openness might lead to faster productivity growth. First, 
increased trade between countries opens channels of communication that 
facilitate the transfer of technical knowledge. Second, greater openness 
increases the competitive pressure on firms to innovate. Third, with a 
larger market in which to sell, the rewards for successful innovation will 
be potentially greater. And fourth, the specialization brought about by 
economic integration may raise an economy’s growth rate if it prompts 
specialization in dynamic sectors.
  In short, there are many ways in which increased openness can lead 
to a lower price level. However, it is important to keep in mind that most 
of these are one-time effects, implying a transitory impact on the inflation 
rate. Nevertheless, these one-time effects may take a long time to play out, 
implying that the temporary effect on the inflation rate may last quite a 
long time. 
  Furthermore, this discussion of effects is partial. A full examination 
of the ways increased integration might impact domestic inflation requires 
a fully articulated general-equilibrium model. The net effect of increased 
integration in such a model is less clear. For example, in the discussion 
above we mention that cheaper imports can directly affect the domestic 
price level. But this will be offset to some extent, depending on how house-
holds make use of the resulting savings. If they spend all the gains on, say, 
domestically produced goods supplied inelastically, there will be an offset-
ting inflationary effect on the domestic price level, which will partially 
or even completely offset the decline due to cheaper imports. Likewise, 
we need to take account of how the foreign suppliers use the proceeds 
from their export sales. With more countries participating in the global 
economy, there will be increased demand for scarce raw materials, which 
















































  Examining the effects of increased openness while assuming no change 
in monetary policy gives us an incomplete picture of how globalization 
might affect inflation. In the long run, central bank policies determine 
inflation, and we need to consider how globalization might affect the infla-
tion rate chosen by central banks over time. As Rogoff (2003) notes, the 
relative price effects associated with globalization will impact inflation 
only if the central bank chooses to let them. 
  The literature has advanced at least two lines of argument about 
how globalization might affect long-run inflation. The first, due to Rogoff 
(2003), considers the political economy of monetary policymaking under 
discretion that uses the workhorse model Barro and Gordon (1983) devel-
oped. The gist of Rogoff’s argument is that by closing the gap between the 
natural rate of output and the desired output level, globalization reduces 
the inflation bias of central banks that are not constrained by rules. The 
second line of argument holds that in a more integrated world, competi-
tion between currencies forces central banks to adopt best practices and 
keeps inflation low. This argument has been advanced by Wagner (2002), 
Tytell and Wei (2004), and others. Key to this “discipline effect” story 
is financial globalization, rather than real (goods and services) globaliza-
tion. 
  The central idea in Barro and Gordon’s (1983) model, which is based 
on Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) insights, is that the monetary authority 
and the public are involved in a game, with the authority making decisions 
that influence the inflation rate and the public forming expectations ac-
cordingly. The basic setup has proved useful in thinking about monetary 
policy and can help us understand the various hypotheses that have been 
advanced to explain the decline in global inflation in recent decades.
  Assume that the central bank has the twin objectives of stabilizing 
output, y, around some target level, y*, and inflation, π, around some 
target level, π*. We can summarize these objectives in the quadratic loss 
function 
(1) L y y*




2 2 ( ) ( ) * ,
where wy>0 and wπ>0 denote the weights the central bank assigns to its 
output stabilization and inflation objectives. Let’s also assume output is 
determined by means of a standard Lucas supply function
(2)  y=yn+α(π-πe)+ε,
where α> 0, yn denotes the natural rate of output, π
e denotes the expected 
rate of inflation, and ε is a supply shock that has an average value of zero. 
The parameter α determines the slope of the Phillips curve (specifically, it 
is the inverse of the slope of the Phillips curve) and is not a deep structural 
parameter. Rather, in a more general model, it will depend on the degree 














































  In this simple model economy, agents are assumed to form their infla-
tion expectations before they know whether the economy will experience a 
favorable or unfavorable supply shock. These expectations then feed into 
their decisions about wages and prices. Once the supply shock occurs, the 
central bank gets to decide monetary policy. For simplicity, we assume the 
central bank controls the inflation rate directly. When the central bank 
is not bound by a rule, it takes private-sector expectations of inflation 
as given when setting the inflation rate. Substituting the supply relation 
(equation 2) into the central bank’s objective function (equation 1) and 
choosing the level of inflation that minimizes the loss function, conditional 










  However, in a rational-expectations equilibrium, private-sector agents 
understand the incentives for the central bank to generate surprise infla-
tions, and they will form their expectation of inflation accordingly. The 
equilibrium inflation rate each period, then, will be
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while in the long run, when supply shocks average out to zero, inflation 
will be 
(5) π π* α
ω
ωπ
= + − ( )
y y* yn .
  The long-run equilibrium inflation rate consists of two terms. First, 
the central bank’s target inflation rate, π*, and second, an inflation bias 
term that arises due to the discretionary nature of the central bank’s 
decisionmaking.  The  size  of  the  inflation  bias  depends  on  the  output 
effect of a surprise inflation (determined by α), the weight the central 
bank puts on stabilizing output versus stabilizing inflation (as reflect-
ed  in  the  ratio  wy/wπ),  and  the  difference  between  the  central  bank’s 
target level of output and the natural rate of output, y*–yn.
  Romer (1993) and Rogoff (2003) use this framework to illustrate how 
increased globalization might have permanent effects on inflation. Romer 
argues that more-open economies will have steeper Phillips curves and 
thus lower values of α. The reason for this is that a monetary expansion 
in an open economy will be accompanied by a real depreciation of the cur-
rency, raising costs for households and businesses. The larger the share of 
imported goods, the greater the increase in inflation. Romer also argues 














































economies, again because of the real depreciation induced by the monetary 
shock.10 
  Rogoff argues that in a more competitive world—brought about by 
globalization, deregulation, and less government involvement in the econo-
my—monetary policy has smaller effects on real activity, which means the 
Phillips curve is steeper and central banks have less incentive to inflate. 
Globalization also has permanent effects on the inflation rate by reducing 
the gap between the central bank’s target level of output and the natural
rate of output:
…[M]onopoly in both the product and labor markets creates a wedge 
between the monopoly level of employment and the corresponding bench-
mark competitive level. Such an imperfection provides the crucial moti-
vation for the central bank to inflate in order to drive employment above 
its “natural” market determined rate. As the wedge becomes smaller, 
there is less to gain from unanticipated inflation. Central bank anti-infla-
tion credibility is enhanced, even without any institutional change. As a 
consequence, average equilibrium inflation falls. Thus, an increased level 
of competition in the economy—due either to globalization or deregula-
tion—not only lowers the real prices of goods, but also tips coordination 
toward a lower inflation equilibrium. (Rogoff 2003, 65)
  Before proceeding, we might note that if the central bank were able to 
commit to its target inflation rate, the inflation bias would disappear. And 
herein lies an important problem in figuring out what has caused inflation 
rates to fall. At the same time the world has become more integrated, we 
have seen an increased reliance on rules-based approaches to monetary 
policy, such as the widespread adoption of inflation targeting and greater 
use of the Taylor rule.11 Both would lead us to expect inflation rates closer 
to the objectives of central banks. But the simple reduced-form framework 
sketched here does not allow us to distinguish the relative importance of 
each. 
10 Lane (1997) points out that the terms-of-trade argument only applies to large countries, 
because the change in domestic output must be substantial enough relative to world output 
to change world relative prices. But the openness–inflation relationship holds empirically 
for small open countries as well. Consequently, Lane follows a different line of reasoning 
to explain the negative correlation. He constructs a two-sector model with a monopolistic 
nontraded goods sector and a competitive sector that produces the homogenous traded good. 
Unexpected inflation is beneficial in this setting because the monopolistic competition results 
in a lower output of nontraded goods than is optimal. Therefore, stimulating output in the 
short run can be welfare-improving. The effects of openness are straightforward: As the 
country becomes more open, the nontraded sector becomes less important than the traded 
goods sector. Therefore, the monetary authorities stand to gain less by creating surprise 
inflation in a more open economy.
11 Referring back to Figure 1, we see low, stable inflation rates in the 1950s and 1960s. 
One interpretation of the global inflation surge of the 1970s is that it resulted from the 
abandonment  of  the  rules-based  framework  for  monetary  policy  that  existed  under  the 














































3. DOCUMENTING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN OPENNESS 
AND INFLATION
  We now move on to review some of the empirical studies of the rela-
tionship between openness and inflation. Evidence suggests that greater 
openness is associated with lower trend inflation. Also, along many dimen-
sions, the U.S. economy does not appear to be very open. Nevertheless, 
measures of global slack do seem more highly correlated with the cyclical 
component of U.S. inflation than are measures of U.S. slack. 
Cross-Country Evidence 
  As noted above, Romer (1993) argues that a major implication of 
the literature on time consistency and monetary policy is that inflation 
should be lower in economies that are more open to trade. He documents 
a negative correlation between openness and long-run inflation, consistent 
with the theory. Figure 8 shows the basic relationship for a slightly smaller 
number of countries than Romer looks at, but for a longer period. 
Figure 8: Inflation and Openness to Trade










SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Imports relative to GDP, average 1973–2004
Annual inﬂation, average 1973–2004 (log scale)
Pairwise correlation
coefﬁcient: –0.35
  While Romer finds the basic correlation is robust to conditioning on 
other variables, he also finds essentially no relationship between openness 
and inflation for the most developed countries. Average inflation in the 
world’s richest countries tends to be low regardless of how open they are. 
Romer interprets this as suggesting these countries have largely solved the 
time-consistency problem that leads to higher inflation in less developed 
countries. However, subsequent research by Lane (1997) and Campillo and 
Miron (1997) finds that even for developed countries, greater openness is 
associated with lower inflation, after conditioning on additional variables. 
Lane emphasizes a different channel through which openness and inflation 
may be related: the degree of imperfect competition and price rigidity in 
the nontraded sector. Lane finds that by conditioning on additional vari-
ables (country size, per capita income, and central bank independence), 
the relationship between openness and inflation is statistically significant 














































Miron also condition on a wider set of variables (measuring prior infla-
tion experience, optimal tax considerations, and time-consistency issues in 
areas other than monetary policy) and again find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between openness and inflation. This is made more 
remarkable by the fact that the authors fail to find central bank inde-
pendence to be a substantial causal factor. Overall, Campillo and Miron 
conclude that it is mainly structural factors—such as openness, political 
stability, and tax policy—not institutional arrangements that drive differ-
ences in inflation across countries. 
  An obvious alternative to the widely adopted approach of using a 
cross-section specification to quantify the openness–inflation relationship 
is to make more use of the time-series structure of the data and use   
panel estimation methods. Alfaro (2005), Sachsida, Carneiro, and Loureiro 
(2003), and Gruben and McLeod (2004) take this approach. However, as 
Romer notes in his original contribution, “Investigating the time-series 
relationship between openness and inflation would be likely to yield biased 
estimates of the effects of openness.” The reason for this is that movement 
in openness within countries is caused by changes in trade policy and 
other macroeconomic factors that could also affect inflation—but through 
channels other than openness. Sachsida et al. and Gruben and McLeod use 
instrumental variable estimators to deal with the endogeneity problem, 
but Alfaro does not. The problem of cyclical movements in inflation can 
be mitigated by averaging observations over multiple years. For example, 
Gruben and McLeod partition the data into five-year averages. They and 
Sachsida et al. find that inflation decreases with openness, whereas Alfaro 
finds the opposite. However, based on our own examination of the data 
(not reported here), her finding seems to rest entirely on her use of an-
nual data. Taking five-year averages, we again find a negative relationship 
between openness and inflation. 
  The literature that has grown out of Romer’s original contribution 
focuses on trade flows as the relevant dimension of openness restraining 
inflation. The reason for this is the central role of the real exchange rate 
depreciation in generating a steeper Phillips curve in more-open econo-
mies, thereby creating a smaller incentive for central banks to inflate. But 
it is worth looking at some of the other dimensions of globalization to see 
whether they, too, are associated with lower long-run inflation rates. The 
two obvious additional dimensions to consider are openness to capital and 
labor flows.
  Figure 9 uses data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) to plot each 
country’s average inflation rate over the past three decades against the 
average level of its foreign liabilities to its GDP. There is a negative corre-
lation, but it does not appear as strong as that between long-run inflation 
and openness to trade.12 The primary mechanism through which greater 
openness to foreign capital might lead to lower inflation is presumably 
some sort of disciplining effect on monetary policy, as Wagner (2002) and 
Tytell and Wei (2004) suggest. 
12 Indeed, the negative correlation is driven by the outliers (Bahrain, Panama, and 
Hong Kong). Once these countries are dropped from the sample, there is a slight positive 














































Figure 9: Inflation and Openness to Capital Flows
Pairwise correlation
coefﬁcient: –0.16










Annual inﬂation, average 1973–2004 (log scale)
Foreign liabilities relative to GDP, average 1973–2004
SOURCES: World Bank, World Development Indicators; web appendix to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), 
  www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip.
  While much of the globalization literature focuses on the trade in   
goods and the movement of capital across borders, relatively little atten-
tion has been paid to the effects of the movement of labor. This doubt-
less reflects the barriers to international movement of workers. As noted 
above, while the United States has the most international migrants, for-
eign workers constitute a larger share of other countries’ populations. The 
mechanism whereby openness to labor flows might lead to lower inflation 
is presumably by allowing the country to draw on a larger pool of work-
ers when economic activity is high.13 Inflows of foreign workers in boom 
times will restrain domestic wage pressures and lead to a flatter Phillips 
curve.14 
  Figure 10 plots average long-run inflation against a crude measure of 
labor market openness, which is simply the share of the population that is 
foreign-born. Again, we see a weak negative correlation: Countries that are 
more open to labor flows seem to have lower inflation over the long run.
  While considering each of these dimensions of openness in isolation is 
interesting, it would be useful to know how inflation correlates with some 
composite measure of openness. A number of such measures exist, among 
13 Bank of England Governor Mervyn King has said it is likely the influx of workers to 
the U.K. from the countries that joined the EU in 2004 has helped restrain inflation pressures 
in the U.K. and enabled the central bank to keep interest rates lower than they would 
otherwise have been. In a June 2006 speech, King noted, “Over the past few years, the impact 
of migration, particularly from the new member countries of the European Union, has been 
substantial. The official data on total net migration are derived from small and incomplete 
surveys, so we cannot pretend to have an accurate idea of the real extent of migration. But, 
based on responses to the International Passenger Survey, net inward migration between 
1995 and 2004 was estimated to have been 1.3 million, compared with a rise in the labor 
force as a whole of 1.7 million. We do know that the labour force has recently been expanding 
twice as fast as in the rest of the post-war period. Migration on this scale raised the potential 
growth rate of the UK economy and probably dampened the response of costs and prices to 
changes in demand” (King 2006).
14 Note that this is the exact opposite of the effect Romer and Rogoff emphasize, 
whereby  inflation  is  lower  in  more-open  economies  because  of  a  steeper  Phillips  curve, 














































them the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index and the index 
Andersen and Herbertsson (2003) developed. The A.T. Kearney index is 
a composite of measures of such factors as trade, telephone lines, tour-
ism, and membership in international organizations. It covers sixty-two 
countries but is only available from 1999 on. A shortcoming of the index 
Andersen and Herbertsson note is that it does not control for country 
size and uses an arbitrary weighting scheme. They propose an alternative 
index that uses factor analysis to combine the various dimensions of open-
ness in a single measure. While the Andersen and Herbertsson measure 
has a somewhat stronger statistical foundation than the A.T. Kearney 
index, it only covers twenty-three OECD countries.
Figure 10: Inflation and Openness to Labor Flows 












SOURCES: World Bank, World Development Indicators; United Nations, World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population 
  Database, http://esa.un.org/migration.
Annual inﬂation, average 1973–2004 (log scale)
Immigrants as a share of population, average 1970–2005
  We instead focus on a subindex—the freedom to trade internation-
ally—of  the  Fraser  Institute’s  Economic  Freedom  of  the  World  index 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2006). This index is a composite measure of taxes 
on international trade, regulatory trade barriers, capital market restric-
tions, and so on. It does not consider labor market openness. While this 
measure does suffer from one of the same disadvantages as the A.T. Kear-
ney measure (an arbitrary weighting scheme), it has the advantage of hav-
ing a long time-series dimension, in addition to covering every country in 
the world. Figure 11 plots each country’s average index score against its 
long-run inflation rate. Again, there is a noticeable negative correlation. 
Interestingly, the negative relationship between this measure of openness 
and long-run inflation seems to be a lot less dependent on extreme obser-
vations. 
The Sacrifice Ratio
  As noted above, Romer identifies two key channels whereby greater 
openness would lead to permanently lower inflation. The first is the effect 
of openness on the slope of the Phillips curve. The second is its effect on 














































Figure 11: Inflation and Overall Openness
Pairwise correlation
coefﬁcient: –0.41










SOURCES: World Bank, World Development Indicators; Gwartney and Lawson (2006).
Annual inﬂation, average 1973–2004 (log scale)
Freedom to trade internationally, average index value 1970–2000
function. It is difficult to measure the relative importance a central bank 
might assign to inflation versus output objectives and how that might cor-
relate with globalization. It is easier to see if more-open economies have 
steeper or flatter Phillips curves.
  Temple (2002) tests this key part of the Romer story by looking at 
whether Phillips curves are, in fact, steeper in more-open economies. He 
starts by examining the relationship between openness and the sacrifice 
ratios that Ball (1994) and Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1989) compute for 
various disinflations. Temple finds that the relationship is at best weak 
and concludes the time-inconsistency explanation may not account for the 
robust openness–inflation result.15 This creates a new openness–inflation 
puzzle. Figure 12 presents the basic evidence. Here we plot estimates of 
the slope of the Phillips curve in various countries against the degree of 
openness of the country, as measured by the share of imports in GDP.16 
There clearly is no meaningful relationship between the two. 
  Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001) examine the relationship between 
the sacrifice ratio and another measure of openness—openness to capital 
flows. They find that countries with more capital controls have lower sac-
rifice ratios (steeper Phillips curves) on average. The authors also use the 
measure created by Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) and base their em-
pirical work on a sample of thirty-five countries. As countries become more 
open to international capital flows, the sacrifice ratio seems to increase, 
or the Phillips curve becomes flatter, contrary to the mechanism that is 
central to the Romer story.
15  Indeed,  Ball  (1994)  also  looks  at  the  relationship  between  his  measure  of  the 
sacrifice ratio and openness as measured by Romer (1993) and is unable to find a significant 
relationship.
16 Specifically, for each country we plot the estimate of the coefficient γ from the simple 
regression ∆πt=γGapt–1+εt, where Gap is measured as the deviation of GDP from a trend 
defined using the Hodrick–Prescott filter along with the country’s ratio of imports to GDP. 
This is, of course, a simplification. As conventionally measured, the sacrifice ratio depends 















































Figure 12: Slope of Phillips Curve and Openness to Trade












Average share of imports in GDP
  Karras (1999) presents evidence more supportive of the Romer story. 
He examines the relationship between money growth and output in a 
sample of thirty-eight countries over the period 1953–90. He finds that the 
more open economies are (as measured by the share of imports in GDP), 
the smaller the effect a change in the money stock has on output. This 
would be consistent with a steeper Phillips curve in more-open economies, 
but Karras’ results need to be interpreted with caution, given the poten-
tial endogeneity of his measure of the money stock, M1.
  Subsequent work by Razin and Yuen (2002) presents theoretical rea-
sons we should expect to see the sacrifice ratio increase with openness. 
Their model extends the model Woodford (2003) developed to an economy 
with international trade and capital mobility. They derive expressions for 
the domestic Phillips curve under three alternative assumptions about 
openness: complete capital and goods mobility, closed capital account but 
open trade account, and closed trade and capital accounts. Under the last 
assumption, the domestic Phillips curve depends on inflation expecta-
tions and the domestic output gap.17 With an open trade account and 
internationally mobile capital, the domestic Phillips curve will depend on 
the foreign as well as the domestic output gap and the real exchange rate. 
Important for our perspective, the slope of the Phillips curve declines as 
the country becomes more open to trade and capital flows. The fraction 
of goods produced domestically is the key parameter determining how 
much flatter the Phillips curve is in the economy with complete mobility 
of goods and capital than in the economy closed to both. The smaller this 
fraction, the flatter the Phillips curve in a globalized world. 
Evidence for the U.S.: Phillips Curve Models
  The evidence reviewed above suggests a significant correlation between 
the degree to which an economy is open to world markets and its long-run 
inflation rate. However, by all the measures looked at and many others, 
17 The output gap concept in this model is the same as that Woodford (2003) uses—i.e., 














































the United States is not a very open economy, which raises the question of 
whether global developments really matter all that much for inflation in 
the U.S. As the introduction notes, there have been a number of attempts 
to isolate globalization’s effects on U.S. inflation. One of the earliest to do 
so was Tootell (1998), who asks whether globalization could account for 
the missing inflation of the late 1990s. Using a standard Phillips curve ap-
proach, he finds little evidence that globalization—specifically, measures 
of foreign slack—helps determine U.S. inflation. Tootell’s sample period 
covers 1973–96, thus missing much of the acceleration in globalization 
that has occurred in the past decade. Perhaps more important, he only 
considers slack in the other G-7 countries (Japan, Germany, U.K., France, 
Italy, and Canada). While these countries accounted for about half of 
U.S. imports over the period Tootell looks at, by 2005 they accounted for 
only 37 percent. Using similar methodology but a different sample period, 
Gamber and Hung (2001) reach the opposite conclusion. They find that 
globalization helped hold down U.S. inflation in the late 1990s.
  Both Tootell and Gamber and Hung use a traditional backward-look-
ing Phillips curve model to address the question of whether and how glo-
balization matters for U.S. inflation. This Phillips curve is usually speci-
fied as






Slack L Z = + + + +
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where Θ(L)=[θ1(L), θ2 (L),…,θN(L)], θj(L) is a polynomial in the lag oper-
ator L, and Zt′=[Z1,t,Z2,t,…,ZN,t] are additional explanatory variables, such 
as dummy variables for price controls, oil prices, and the terms of trade. 
The lagged inflation terms are often interpreted as capturing the effect of 





1βi=1 is often imposed to ensure no long-run trade-off 
between Slack and inflation. The variable Slack is usually measured as the 
unemployment or capacity utilization rate, or the deviation of these series 
from some estimate of their natural or long-run rate, or the deviation of 
aggregate output from some estimate of potential or trend. There is little 
consensus on what variables belong in Z. The choice is usually dictated 
by a desire to improve the fit of some previously estimated version of the 
traditional model or the desire to evaluate the incremental explanatory 
power of some new variable.
  One way of thinking about how globalization might matter for do-
mestic inflation developments would be to argue that the traditional Phil-
lips curve model is only useful in explaining the evolution of the prices 
of domestically produced goods, with the prices of imported goods be-
ing determined on world markets. Thus, overall inflation, π, would be 
viewed as a weighted average of the inflation rate of domestically pro-
duced goods and services, π




Import, where ϕ represents the share of imports. This 
is essentially the approach Tootell and Gamber and Hung take, although 














































  Tootell argues that the distinction is important, insofar as oil prices 
over the period he looks at (1973–96) were determined primarily by geo-
political considerations, rather than global capacity utilization. The prices 
of non-oil imports, on the other hand, might be expected to be more re-
sponsive to measures of global slack. 
  Tootell estimates a version of equation 5, with oil prices and a mea-
sure of global slack included as elements of the Z vector. He measures slack 
in terms of deviation from a constant, natural rate of unemployment in 
the other G-7 countries and finds no statistically significant relationship 
with U.S. inflation. Column 1 of Table 1 reports our attempt to replicate 
the results in his Table 2; we come close but cannot do so. The sum of 
the estimated coefficients on the foreign output gap, –0.04, is close to his 
estimate of –0.05. It is also statistically insignificant. We find that the 
sum of the coefficients on the domestic unemployment rate is –0.10, with 
a p value of 5.6 percent; Tootell estimates the sum as –0.11 and finds it is 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
  Column 2 of Table 1 reports what happens when we extend the sam-
ple to include the past ten years. Note that the sum of the coefficients on 
the domestic unemployment rate declines to –0.06 and is now significant 
only at the 10 percent level. This is consistent with the evidence presented 
above. The sum of the coefficients on the foreign output gaps rises in 
(absolute) magnitude to –0.07, with a p value of 2.9 percent. That is, add-
ing observations from the period with the most dramatic acceleration in 
globalization causes foreign-output-gap variables to show up as significant 
in Tootell’s specification.
Table 1: Estimating Global Slack’s Effect on U.S. Inflation:  
Tootell’s (1998) Model
(1) (2)
Constant .66 (2.3) .35 (2.3)
U.S. unemployment –.10 (5.6) –.06 (5.2)
Lagged inflation 1 1
Oil import price inflation .98 (2.2) .17 (0.2)
Foreign output gap –.04 (1.5) –.07 (6.3)
Nixoff .72 (2.9) .79 (3.8)
Sample period 1973:Q3–1996:Q2 1973:Q3–2006:Q1
Number of observations 92 131
R
–2 .79 .84
Log likelihood –17.51 –13.81
NOTES: Dependent variable is the quarter-to-quarter change in the Consumer Price Index 
excluding food and energy. Coefficients on two lags of the unemployment rate are summed; 
t  statistics  in  parentheses,  F  statistics  in  the  case  of  summed  coefficients.  Sum  of  the 
coefficients on 12 lags of the dependent variable constrained to add to 1. Foreign output gap 
measured as the trade-weighted deviation of unemployment from the estimated NAIRU in 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the U.K. Nixoff is a dummy variable capturing 














































  We should be careful about reading too much into this, however. To 
begin with, Tootell’s measure of foreign slack covers only the other mem-
bers of G-7. While these countries accounted for about half of U.S. im-
ports in the 1970s and ’80s, that share has since declined to just over one-
third, with countries like China growing in importance. Second, Tootell 
measures slack in terms of the deviation of unemployment from a constant 
NAIRU. An examination of the history of unemployment and inflation 
in the other G-7 countries suggests that the NAIRU is unlikely to be 
constant but instead evolves over time as demographics and labor market 
institutions change. 
  Gamber and Hung (2001) also estimate traditional backward-looking 
Phillips curves to assess the importance of global slack for U.S. inflation 
developments. They estimate a generously parameterized model, with for-
eign slack measured as a trade-weighted average of capacity utilization 
in the United States’ thirty-five major trading partners, including such 
countries as China, India, Brazil, and Russia. They find that their measure 
of foreign excess capacity has additional explanatory power even after con-
trolling for the price of non-oil imports, the prices of food and energy, and 
the deviation of labor productivity growth from trend. They consider this 
evidence that foreign excess capacity has tended to lower U.S. inflation 
through channels other than the traditional import price channel.
  We were unable to replicate and update Gamber and Hung’s results. 
An attempt to construct measures of slack for a wider range of countries 
than those in the OECD rapidly runs into severe data constraints. Some 
of the newly emerging economies lack comprehensive sets of national ac-
counts or only have data for short spans or report high frequency (e.g., 
quarterly) data in a way that makes it difficult to separate the trend from 
the cycle. For example, China only reports real GDP data in levels at 
an annual frequency starting in 1978; quarterly real GDP data are only 
reported on a twelve-month-change basis starting in 2000. Russia reports 
quarterly real GDP in levels, but only starting in 1995. 
  To examine whether U.S. inflation developments are more correlated 
with some measure of global slack than with some measure of domestic 
slack, we constructed a world-output-gap variable using data on real GDP 
at an annual frequency for a group of major U.S. trading partners—the 
euro area, the U.K., Canada, Japan, Mexico, China, India, and Brazil. 
Combined, these countries account for more than 80 percent of U.S. im-
ports. (China, Mexico, Brazil, and India alone account for more than 30 
percent; in 1995, for only 17.7 percent.)
  We constructed a world-output-gap variable using annual real GDP 
data for this group of countries, detrending the data using the Hodrick–
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 100, then combining 
the individual country gaps thus estimated using trade weights.18 
18 The measure of the U.S. output gap constructed using the HP filter is very highly 
correlated with the measure of the U.S. output gap constructed using a production function 
approach and reported by the OECD in its semiannual Outlook. The pairwise correlation 






























































SOURCE: OECD Economic Outlook.
  Figure 13 plots the estimated gap series, along with a measure of the 
U.S. output gap constructed in the same manner. Note that the two series 
are highly correlated, with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.67. Table 
2 reports the correlation between various measures of the U.S. price level 
and inflation and our measures of U.S. and global slack.
  There seems to be no systematic relationship between the cyclical 
component of inflation and the U.S. output gap. The correlations are 
negative or positive, depending on which measure of the price level is used. 
Column 2 of Table 2 reports the correlations between the U.S. output 
gap and the change in inflation. This is the basic correlation at the heart 
of traditional backward-looking accelerationist Phillips curve models. As 
we see, the correlations are all positive and of the magnitude commonly 
found in the literature—that is, U.S. inflation tends to increase when U.S. 
output is above trend.
  The last two columns in the table report the same correlations, but with 
our measure of the world output gap. We do not see the sizable correlations 
between the change in inflation and the measure of the world output gap 
(column 4) that we saw between the change in inflation and the measure 
of the U.S. output gap. Indeed, in some cases the correlations run counter 
to what might be expected based on the traditional accelerationist model.   
  However, note that there seems to be a fairly robust positive correla-
tion between the cyclical component of inflation and the world output 
gap. The correlation coefficients range from 0.32 to 0.55, depending on 
the measure of the price level. (By comparison, the correlation between 
the change in inflation and the U.S. output gap ranges from 0.34 to 0.66.) 
This is consistent with what a number of other researchers have found. For 
example, Balakrishnan and Ouliaris (2006) argue that changes in global 
trade and factor markets have affected the business-cycle component of 
U.S. inflation more than the trend component. Likewise, Borio and Filar-
do (2006) document an increased correlation between measures of global 















































Table 2: Correlation Between Output Gaps and Inflation 





























–.27 .66 .32 .08
GDP deflator –.07 .60 .34 –.20
NOTES: Sample period for U.S. is 1970–2005, for world, 1991–2005. Annual data detrended 
using HP filter with smoothing parameter equal to 100. Change in inflation rate measured as 
πt+1–πt. Sources for the CPI and CPI excluding food and energy are Haver Analytics series 
PCURS and PCULFER. 
 4. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
  This article provides a preliminary review of the literature on global-
ization and inflation. We document the trend toward greater integration 
in recent years, at both the world and U.S. levels, then review the various 
channels through which greater economic integration might impact infla-
tion in the United States. We start with an evaluation of the claim that 
more-open economies tend to have lower inflation in the long run. There is 
clearly a negative correlation in the cross-country data between openness 
and long-run inflation. We also present some tentative evidence that it is 
not just openness to trade that is correlated with lower inflation but also 
openness to labor and capital flows.
  In the final section of the paper, we ask whether there is evidence that 
global slack is important in explaining the U.S. inflation picture of recent 
years. We find some evidence that global slack does matter, especially over 
the past decade and at business-cycle frequencies.
  Our evidence should be interpreted with caution, as it is based on 
simple correlations and reduced-form models. But it does suggest a num-
ber of avenues for further research. 
  1. Measuring openness: What matters? While the cross-country evi-
dence suggests a robust negative relationship between openness and infla-
tion, the literature tends to focus on openness to trade. We present some 
tentative evidence that openness to factor flows (capital and labor) may 
also matter, but our measures of these flows are far from perfect and 
have limited coverage. As noted above, ideally, an economy’s openness 
should be assessed using price data rather than quantity flows, although as 














































  2. Evaluating the severity of the time-consistency problem in gen-
eral-equilibrium models. To date, the most coherent argument for how 
greater openness might lead to permanent reductions in inflation rates has 
been based on the time-consistency approach to thinking about monetary 
policy. While this theory has proven difficult to test empirically, a number 
of authors argue that its predictions for how openness may affect inflation 
offer a useful test. Simple correlations do seem to bear out the theory’s 
central prediction, but they do not allow us to distinguish between this 
and other explanations for the global decline in inflation of recent years. 
Neiss (1999) and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003a, b) go beyond 
the reduced-form models of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983) to examine the severity of the time-consistency problem in 
the context of structural general-equilibrium models. Neiss finds that in 
a model with monopolistic competition and price rigidities, the monetary 
authorities will set inflation too high if there is no commitment mecha-
nism. Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano find that the severity of the time-
consistency problem depends crucially on how the demand for money is 
modeled. An obvious area for further research is to explore the severity of 
the time-consistency problem in the context of structural models of open 
economies. 
   
  3. The open-economy Phillips curve. A key part of Romer’s (1993) 
story about why inflation is lower in more-open economies is that the Phil-
lips curve is steeper in such economies, which means that a central bank in 
such an economy will have less incentive to generate a surprise inflation. 
However, it is not at all obvious from the data that Phillips curves are 
steeper in more-open economies. Indeed, Razin and Yuen (2002) present 
a theoretical model in which the Phillips curve becomes flatter as the 
economy becomes more open. It would be interesting to see how the corre-
lation between inflation and the cyclical component of inflation changes in 
a standard international business-cycle model as economies become more 
integrated.
   
  4. Discriminating between different explanations of the decline in 
global inflation. Both Romer (1993) and Rogoff (2003) use the Barro–Gor-
don model of monetary policy decisionmaking to explain inflation’s world-
wide decline over the past decade. Yet as our simple exposition of that 
model shows, the decline in inflation rates could be due to a myriad of 
factors: lower target inflation rates, a greater weight on inflation stabiliza-
tion than on output stabilization, steeper Phillips curves, or a decline in 
the wedge between the natural and socially optimal output levels. An im-
portant area for research is determining how much of the decline in global 
inflation can be attributed to better monetary policy and how much is due 
to other factors, such as globalization and perhaps even luck. 
   
  5. Structural models of economic integration. In our discussion of 
how greater integration might impact U.S. inflation, we sketch out various 
direct and indirect channels whereby the availability of cheaper imports 














































We also point out some potential offsets to these effects. Purely literary or 
reduced-form analysis does not allow us to say with confidence how these 
net out. That can only be done in the context of a fully articulated gen-
eral-equilibrium model on international trade and capital flows. While tra-
ditional trade theory is replete with such models, many are purely static, 
and few, if any, have a meaningful role for money or monetary policy.
   
  6. Monetary policy in a frictionless world. An important issue not ad-
dressed here is the extent to which the factors driving integration may also 
undermine monetary policy’s ability to affect real economic activity. The 
real effects of monetary policy spring from frictions of one sort or another. 
In many cases, the policy and technology innovations driving the global 
economic integration also reduce frictions that may have contributed to 
monetary policy’s ability to affect real activity. The most obvious example 
is the innovations in information technology that are making prices more 
flexible. Rogoff (2003) argues that the increased competition resulting 
from globalization has made wages and prices more flexible, so that mon-
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